ABSTRACT The idea of the Internet of Things (IoT) was developed in parallel to wireless sensor networks (WSNs). In a mobile WSN, a sensor node is generally assumed to move around randomly in direction and speed. Thus, a random waypoint is commonly used for node mobility modeling. Unfortunately, it does not consider the overlapping sensing coverage (OSC) at continuous moves or at a given time of sensor nodes. On top of this, there is no security mechanism to authenticate the sensor nodes and their privacy. Thus, results in a higher probability of occurring OSC in the network and the threats to the network through inside and outside attackers. To resolve these issues in 3D WSNs, this paper proposes a secure and privacy-preserving node mobility model that the nodes take part in periodic rounds securely. An ID-based authentication mechanism for joining nodes in the network and detection of the malicious node based on their survival strategies are proposed in the model. Moreover, the decision making of a next destination during a pause time in a round is three-folded. First, a set of member nodes are elected. Then, all nodes predict their prospective destinations randomly and the member nodes broadcast their prospective destinations' information to neighbors. Finally, the neighborhood nodes adjust their prospective destinations considering the broadcasted information, in order to reduce the OSC in the network. The simulation experiments show that the proposed model reduces the OSC in the network and detects the malicious nodes, thus, results in a higher effective sensing coverage rate of the network in a secure way.
I. INTRODUCTION
Internet of things (IoT) integrates real-world objects into the virtual world, enabling sensors, actuators, and other mobile devices to interact with human users as well as interact with the Internet and software agents [1] , [2] . Today, wireless sensor networks (WSNs) are useful for applications ranging from underwater to land. These networks can also be integrated into the IoT by using sensors to connect the entire physical infrastructure to information and communications technology closely coupled.
The idea of IoT was developed in parallel with WSN. The term 'Internet of things' devised in 1999 is intended of any infrastructure [6] . In recent years, researchers have been studying on communicating traffic patterns which generally stand for data routing protocols with several sensor nodes mobility models [7] - [12] . Among them, the random waypoint (RWP) of node mobility [13] is widely used due to its simple implication mostly in the simulation environments.
The mobility model is designed to describe the movement pattern of mobile nodes, and how their locations, velocities, and accelerations change over time. Since a mobility pattern may play a significant role in determining the network protocol performance, it is desirable for mobility models to emulate the movement pattern of targeted real-life applications in a reasonable way. However, security and privacy of the sensor nodes in the IoT-WSN is also an important concern. Establishing trust with respect to the confidential treatment of private information. Moreover, maintaining location privacy of sensor node to deny an attacker, the knowledge of node current and previous locations. Verification and validation of joining nodes during network operation are also important challenges.
According to the RWP model in WSNs, the sensing tasks of a sensor node can be classified into two different classes: a discrete time based sensing and a continuous time based sensing. A discrete time-based sensing defines a node to sense information at a given time that commonly uses a node's pause time and then resume to move around. On the other hand, a continuous time based sensing defines a node to sense simultaneously along with its random walk. In both of these cases, the random walks of nodes have a significant impact on WSN performance due to the degree of overlapping sensing coverage (OSC) of a number of deployed nodes in a network. For example, an OSC causes the sensing data redundancy and the consequence is the waste of energy of nodes.
Meanwhile, a higher probability of occurring OSC can reduce the effective sensing coverage (ESC) of nodes in a network. In this consequence, the RWP model may have a great impact on the effective sensing coverage rate (ESCR) of the network. For instance, if a network field and the sensing range of the deployed nodes are fixed, the overlapping probability strongly relates with the number of deployed nodes. When the number of deployed nodes in a network is higher, the probability of OSC is also higher. Fig.1 shows a snapshot of the density of OSC for 50 sensor nodes at a given time (i.e., a node's pause time with sensing radius 5m in a region of 100 × 100 × 100 m 3 ) of the RWP model in a 3D WSN.
Aimed to solve these problems aforementioned, a secure and privacy preserving partial deterministic random waypoint node mobility model called PdRWP in IoT sensing environment is proposed. This model provides an identity (ID)-based authentication mechanism that checks the authorization of joining sensor nodes in the network and also detects a malicious node based on its survival strategies. In addition, the model divides the application time into periodic rounds, and each round consists of two disjoint times: pause time and walk time. Then a pause time is separated into three stages: firstly a percentage of nodes are elected as member nodes. In next, all nodes predict their prospective destinations randomly, and the elected member nodes broadcast their encrypted destinations' information to neighborhood nodes. Upon receiving the information from those member nodes, the neighborhood normal nodes adjust their prospective destinations with considering the information received from the member node(s), to reduce the OSC in the IoT-WSN. Once the decisions for the next destinations are finalized, all nodes start their walks towards the destinations uniformly during the walk time in a round. Meanwhile, this model has also set a priority on designing the algorithm that has a low overhead of control messages in order to get low overhead on controlling the mobility.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II presents an overview of the RWP model and security issues in IoT-WSN as related work. Section III contains the preliminaries of relevant factors that have used in the performance evaluation of this proposed model. Section IV describes a 3D WSN model, the proposed node mobility, and the security algorithm in details. The simulations with results discussion is presented in Section V. Section VI concludes this work.
II. RELATED WORK A. RANDOM WAYPOINT MODEL
Several random based waypoint models have been described in [14] . The RWP mobility model was first proposed in [13] . Rapidly, it became a 'benchmark' model to evaluate the routing protocols in mobile ad-hoc network because of its simplicity and wide availability. According to the different network simulators (such as ns-3 and others), a typical implementation of the RWP mobility model is as follows:
• As the simulation starts, each mobile node randomly and uniformly selects one location as a next destination in the simulation network field. For this, each node generates its directional angle, velocity, and walk duration randomly and uniformly.
• It then travels towards the destination with chosen constant velocity. The velocity is the maximum allowable velocity for every mobile node. The velocity and the VOLUME 7, 2019 direction to walk of a node are chosen independently. In the case, when a node touches a boundary edge of the network field, it generates an opposite directional angle of the generated one.
• Upon reaching the destination, the node stops for a random duration defined by the 'pause time' and when the pause time is zero, leads to continuous mobility.
• After pause duration, it again chooses another random destination in the simulation network field and moves towards it. The whole process is repeated again and again until the simulation ends. To make clear about node mobility of the above steps, an example of the movement trace of a node in a 3D region is shown in Fig. 2 . The RWP model and its variants are designed to mimic the movement of mobile nodes in a simplified way. Due to the simplicity of implementation and analysis, it has been widely accepted. However, the 'pause time' parameter of the RWP model should be very carefully considered because a node senses and communicates with other nodes during this time. In addition, the speed of two nodes has to be relatively determined in order to keep the communication link between them, rather than their absolute individual speed [15] . Because these come from the randomness in every factors of the RWP model, it is strongly required to suggest the proper mobility parameters.
Moreover, it may not adequately capture certain mobility behaviors of some realistic scenarios. For instance, the minimum range of the speed interval sometimes hinders to reach a certain steady state in terms of the level of node mobility, where the average node speed is stabilized around a constant. To resolve this, a simplified solution has been given in [16] , where a considerably big value of minimum speed is suggested so that the node's average speed cannot be close to zero. Surely, it is desirable for any simulation to reach stability as soon as possible. Meanwhile, the higher probability of OSC of the RWP model reduces the overall network's effective sensing coverage rate (NESCR) which may have a vital impact in an energy constraint IoT-WSN.
Unlike the RWP model, the PdRWP model defines the 'pause time' and 'walk time' are periodic and the time duration of these parameters are fixed. It would be made easier to synchronize the communication link setup between the nodes. In the proposed model, a number of normal nodes can partially determine their next destinations based on a set of member nodes' prospective destinations decision in order to reduce the probability of occurring OSC in the network as a whole.
B. IoT IN WSN
The common vision of smart grid, smart homes, smart water networks, intelligent transportation, and other smart systems is usually associated with one single concept, the IoT, where through the use of sensors.
The sensing coverage of the WSN study has received considerable attention [17] . To use a WSN within the IoT, the IoT characteristics should be considered when considering the scope of the detection. These characteristics include heterogeneity, extravagance, dynamism, randomness, and multiple ownership. Yaser Al Mtawa et al. [18] proposed a detection range analysis in IoT, where the sensing resources (sensors) are random, mobile or static and belong to different owners, and are heterogeneous in terms of sensing and communication functions.
Recent developments in computing, communications, and micro-electromechanical technology have made significant changes in WSN research and are nearing the core vision. A new wave of WSN research focuses on networking technologies and information processing that are appropriate for highly dynamic centers and resource-constrained sensor nodes. IEC market strategy board [19] summarizes the challenges and security for future network of WSN in a wide range of applications including efficiency, device access, trust, and privacy among IoT devices.
C. SECURITY AND PRIVACY ISSUES IN MOBILITY OF IoT-WSN
It is well known that WSNs are inherently more vulnerable than wired networks. Complexity also arises when node mobility and dynamic network topology exist. In addition, intermittent connectivity causes additional problems due to portability, depending on whether or hibernation. At the same time, it is difficult even if it is not impossible to adapt existing security solutions directly because of node's resourceconstraints due to battery operation (power), weak transceiver (bandwidth), and small memory/storage. Finally, in some configurations of security problems are exacerbated by the size of the node's network and/or the possibility of physically inaccessible. Some factors contributing to security problems are as follows:
Accessibility: While some devices are personal and usually attended by their owners, others (i.e., sensors or robots) are generally left unattended, and are placed in remote and/or hostile locations. This greatly increases their vulnerability to physical attacks.
Mobility: Although not all wireless devices are mobile, wirelessness, by its very nature, enables mobility. In wireless communication, a physical connection is replaced by a logical association and must be renewed whenever a wireless device moves beyond transmission range. Establishing a secure association in the presence of mobility is difficult, especially in high mobility environments such as VANETs. Simultaneously, if the wireless device is affiliated with a person, tracking the device will show the person's position and mobility pattern which causes privacy disclosure of sensor nodes in the network. Thus, privacy becomes an important concern.
Impersonation: Through inspection, the adversary can catch the authentication information, and then the spoofing attack can be done.
Performer-Oriented: The attack consists of internal and external attacks. If an attacker inserts a false/unnecessary packet to cause denial-of-service (DoS) on sensor nodes and exhausts the resources of the nodes, an attack from the outside is made. If a malicious node takes legitimate action and destroys the network slowly, an internal attack will occur.
Location Privacy: Attackers may locate the sink easily by reading the destination field in the packet header or predicting the arrival of the sink at the rendezvous point, which opens up vulnerabilities to location privacy of the sink.
D. EXISTING SECURITY RESEARCHES IN IoT-WSN
Ruhul Amin and G.P. Biswas [20] proposed a scheme of lightweight user authentication and key agreement protocol for accessing the sensed data through gateway node over an insecure network. Edith C.H. Ngai and Ioana Rodhe [21] proposed a random data collection scheme to protect the location privacy of mobile sinks in WSNs. The data are forwarded along random paths and the sinks are moved around randomly to collect data from the local nodes occasionally, which prevents the attackers from predicting their locations and movements. Ding Wang and Ping Wang [22] demonstrated privacy breaches into two password authentication schemes for WSNs. The authors studied on better understanding of the inherent complexity in achieving user privacy. Public-key techniques are intrinsically indispensable to achieve user intraceability. Jun Zhou et al. [23] introduced the architecture and unique security and privacy requirements for the next generation mobile technologies on cloud-based IoT. It identifies the inappropriateness of most existing work, and addresses the challenging issues of secure packet forwarding and efficient privacy preserving authentication by proposing new efficient privacy preserving data aggregation without public key homomorphic encryption.
There are several approaches devoted to the study of hierarchical mobile WSNs. The placement and relocation of multiple sink-based data collections (MDCs) are investigated in [24] . Data collection approach to support mobility with MDCs is presented in [25] .
E. CHALLENGES IN IoT-WSN
The possible issues using sensor in IoT, not much can be named differently than any other embedded applications [26] , [27] . The challenges are due to the following issues:
Mobility: Moving IoT users (i.e., vehicles and mobile electricity consumers) are dynamically categorized into multiple social groups according to their directions, velocities, and accelerations, and assumed to be uniformly distributed. Therefore, if signal conditioning is required to interface with other sensors, must consider the size and power consumption.
Data Transmission: Data transmission and reception are performed. It may want to keep network traffic and power consumption problems as small as possible. So the sampling rate and precision are needed to be defined wisely.
Battery life: Depending on the use case needed to implement, it should consider battery life. The time that the device must transmit data without replacing the battery.
Durability: IoT devices must be durable depending on the environment they should use. It may be necessary to use the device for extreme temperatures, humidity, corrosive environments, and so on.
Accuracy: Depending on the requirements, it should consider the accuracy of the sensor. For example, it needs a humidity sensor to create a weather observer.
III. PRELIMINARIES
In a 3D WSN, the nodes mobility can be defined as follows: ''Given a N number of sensor nodes, each of which has a sensing range r and a transmission range R respectively, and are initially placed with random coordinates (x 0 , y 0 , z 0 ) with a given boundaries of volume V . Each node has mobility and walks randomly''. Our goal is to maximize the ESCR of the individual node's and network's perspective at a given time (i.e., during a node's pause time).
Some assumptions in the context of IoT-WSN are as follows:
• IoT sensors can send and receive packets with neighbors. This assumption is important to exchange information from the IoT sensor locally, perhaps via multi-hop, in order to build the computational structure in a distributed manner.
• IoT sensors know their locations.
• No three IoT sensors are collinear. This assumption enables constructing the Delaunay triangulation.
• The sensing target field is bounded. This is the case for most IoT applications.
A. NETWORK COVERAGE
A 3D WSN coverage is defined by the targeted region where the nodes have to be deployed. If the network field is a polygon, a rectangular volume with length, width and height VOLUME 7, 2019 or depth as (X , Y , Z ) where X ≤ Y , the volume of the network coverage is V = XYZ .
B. SENSING COVERAGE
The sensing coverage of a node depends on the node's allowable sensing range as radius r that a node can sense or on the designated protocols applied on it. As a 3D network field differs from a 2D network field, a spherical volume is commonly used as a sensing coverage (V SC ) of a deployed node in a 3D WSN. The V SC of a node s i is defined as in Eq. (1).
For N nodes at a given time (t j ), the total volume of sensing coverage (TV SC ) is acting upon the nodes on sensing at that moment as defined in Eq. (2).
C. OVERLAPPING SENSING COVERAGE (OSC)
A sensing region is overlapped when that particular region is the interior of more than one node. An example of an OSC of intersected sensing coverage of two nodes in a 3D region is shown in Fig. 3(a) . Here, the OSC in a 3D region can be simplified into 2D plane as shown in Fig. 3(b) . Measuring OSC of two nodes in a 3D region can be simplified as measuring the volume of a 3D lens. A 3D lens contains two 3D caps with the same base radius a and the same height h corresponding to the two intersected nodes. The sensing coverage of two nodes is overlapped each other when the distance between them is d(s i , s j ) < 2r. The volume of a 3D cap of the 3D lens according to one of the intersected nodes (i.e., according to a node s i ) is derived in Eq. (3).
where, V O is the volume of intersected region, the 3D coordinates can be represented in a 2D plane, and the variants can be defined according to a node s i as;
Finally, the volume of the 3D lens is adding the two 3D caps and summing their volumes as defined in Eq. (4).
The volume of the total OSC of a node with the assumption that there is no common interior region of more than two nodes (i.e., except the nodes s i and s j ) is derived in Eq. (5). where, TV O is the total volume of OSC of s i with s j , i, j = {1, 2, 3, . . . , N } at any given time or at a continuous time.
D. EFFECTIVE SENSING COVERAGE (ESC)
In a 2D WSN field, the seamless determination of the ESC of a deployed node is acquired when its sensing area is intersecting with other deployed node(s)' sensing area. Compared to the 2D plane, the ESC measuring problem in a 3D region is more complex, even if the fundamental idea to measure that is quite similar as that in 2D plane.
1) EFFECTIVE SENSING COVERAGE RATE (ESCR) OF A NODE'S PERSPECTIVE

Definition 1 (V ESC ):
For an arbitrary node s i , the volume of its effective sensing coverage (V ESC ) is the V SC of node s i subtracts its TV O as defined in Eq. (6) . If a number of intersected nodes with a node are higher, the V ESC of the node can be negative.
Definition 2 (ESCR):
An effective sensing coverage rate (ESCR) of a node s i is 1 minus the ratio of its TV O to V SC as defined in Eq. (7).
ESCR(s i
Meanwhile, we can derive the ESCR of total nodes' perspective as nESCR defined in Eq. (8) .
The total volume of the network's effective sensing coverage (V NESC ) is the total V ESC of the nodes as defined in Eq. (9) .
Definition 4 (NESCR): The network's effective sensing coverage rate (NESCR) is the ratio of the V NESC to the entire network coverage as defined in Eq. (10) .
IV. THE PROPOSED MODEL
This section describes the particulars of our proposed model. All the nodes have mobility. To highlight the emphasis, few rational assumptions are proposed. The nodes known their initial coordinates (x i , y i , z i ), i = 0, as well as they are familiar with the boundary edges of the 3D network field.
B. ALGORITHM IN DETAILS
The proposed scheme is divided into a number of discrete time durations called rounds and each round is divided into two different consecutive time durations called 'pause time' and 'walk time' as shown in Fig. 5 . The duration of the pause time and the walk time are defined by the parameters T P and T W , respectively. The duration of a round, r t depends on the T P and T W . A round is counted on the time interval defined as a sum of the T P and T W . An r t can be defined based on the probable circumstances of a 3D WSN application. Each of the deployed nodes decides its next destination to walk during each pause time in each round. 
1) PAUSE TIME
During this period of time, a node collects information, communicates with other nodes, and decides its next destination to walk. It is periodic, therefore, when a node reaches the destination after a walk, it stops for a while defined by the T P . Here, the T P is fixed and predefined unlike the RWP. As the T W is fixed for all nodes, all nodes uniformly stop at the same time for T P .
A pause time contains three different consecutive time slots t 1 , t 2 and t 3 that are defined for next destinations selection of the nodes in each round. Our scheme proposes a percentage, P of the deployed nodes are elected as a set C periodically during each pause time. After the member nodes election, all nodes predict their prospective destinations. Then the member nodes broadcast their prospective destinations' information to its neighborhood normal nodes. On receiving the information from the member nodes, the nodes which are not member nodes but received the broadcasted information can adjust their prospective destinations according to the given condition. However, the procedures that are defined during the time slots in a pause time as shown in Fig. 5 are described in details in the following subsections.
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Member nodes are elected during t 1 in each pause time in every round. Nodes are elected as member nodes that are defined by the parameters P and C. The P and C can be defined in different ways. For this proposed model, we have effectively utilized the technique to define these parameters which have been described in LEACH [28] . According to the LEACH, an average percentage P of the nodes are elected as a set C in each round. Electing of the set C is periodic, therefore, when a set C is elected at time T Ci of a round, a new set C will be elected at time T Ci+1 of next round. A node can select itself as a member of the current set C by generating a random number in the interval [0,1] and comparing with the threshold T (n) as defined in Eq. (11) . If the generated number of a node is less than T (n), then, it is elected as a member node of set C. When a node is elected as a member node, it changes its node type as a normal node 'NN' to a member node 'MN' for that particular round.
where, nr t is the number of the current round that is defined by the modulo of (T C , r t ), T C is the current time of the current round and G is the set of nodes that have not been as a member nodes in the last 1/P rounds.
b: PROSPECTIVE DESTINATIONS SELECTION BY CONSTITUTED NODES AND BROADCAST CONTROL MESSAGES
Once the member nodes election process has finished, all constituted nodes decide their prospective destinations during t 2 . For this, all nodes generate a directional angle θ interval of [θ min ,θ max ] and an average maximum velocity V randomly and uniformly interval of [V min ,V max ]. When these parameters are defined, each member node estimates the coordinates of its prospective destination. In a 3D region, the z-coordinate of a next location can be defined in different ways. Here, a node can estimate the coordinates of a next destination as; (x i+1 , y i+1 ,
, where the T W is fixed and predefined unlike the RWP model. During this time, each member node broadcasts its prospective destination's information along with the control message called Alert_Msg within its transmission range R. An Alert_Msg contains information of a node's hashed ID, node's type and coordinates of a node's prospective destination. The message is encrypted by a shared secret key K as E K (Alert_Msg). The nodes that reside the range receive the message and decrypt the message as D K (Alert_Msg). The secret key is updated periodically by the BS. Upon receiving the message(s), each recipient node lists the information in its neighborhood member node table (NMT) that contains [node_ID(hashed), node_type, next_location]. The variable next_location contains the coordinates of a prospective destination of a member node. Once a member node has broadcasted the message, it waits for the walk time until the T P has finished.
c: ADJUSTMENT OF PROSPECTIVE DESTINATIONS BY NORMAL NODES
The normal nodes that have received the message(s) during t 2 , calculate the coordinates of their prospective destinations during t 3 . The coordinates of a next location calculation is similar to that has been described in the above subsection. During the t 3 , each of the normal nodes checks it NMT. If its NMT is not empty, it checks the distance of the member nodes(s)' according to their estimated prospective destinations. If the distance(s) is less than 2r, and the number of member nodes is more than one, it selects the smaller distance obtaining member node from its NMT. Finally, it adjusts its directional angle as θ = (θ ± φ) based on the prospective distance of the member node according to their estimated prospective destinations. More clearly, if a normal node's z-coordinate value z i+1 (s i ) is less than and equal to the zcoordinate value z i+1 (s j ) of the member node, then the directional angle of the normal node is θ i (
The adjustable angle φ of a node s i is defined Eq. (12).
where, the distance variants are calculated as;
In case, if a normal node's NMT is empty, its directional angle remains the same with the other parameters for its walk. Once this step is finished, each normal node waits for the walk time until the T P has finished.
2) WALK TIME
At the end of a pause time, all nodes then travel towards the destinations with their generated constant velocities and directions. The velocity of a node is chosen independently but the direction can be partially determined for a set of nodes that are satisfied by the conditions. As the T W is fixed rather than the random and uniform as like RWP, the next destination of a node depends on the parameters of 'velocity' and 'direction' only.
The remaining steps are similar as the RWP model. The pseudo-code of the PdRWP model is given in Algorithm 1.
3) UNAUTHORIZED NODE DETECTION
The authorization of the nodes are checked by the BS during node deployment and joining new nodes during network operation. The unwanted nodes are detected as block listed through the authorization based on the assigned secret original IDs of the participating nodes. An unauthorized node's 
All nodes in pause time 7: end 8:
if mod (T C , r t ) == 0 do 9:
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for i = 1: N 14:
Selects a prospective destination 15:
Generates a random number and compare with T (n) 16:
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Broadcasts E K (Alert_Msg) within range R 18: end 19:
Receives Alert_Msg (neighborhood normal node) 21:
Decrypt D K (Alert_Msg) and updates information is broadcasted over the network and is excluded out from the rest of the network operation. The authorization process of the nodes are shown in Fig. 6. 
4) MALICIOUS NODE DETECTION
A malicious node is detected based on its survival strategies. The strategies can be labeled as 'Yes' or 'No' as shown in Table 1 . A node falls under any of the labels is detected as a malicious node. The information of a malicious node is broadcasted over the network and the node is excluded out from the rest of the network operation. The survival strategies are defined as follows:
DO_NOTHING: In this strategy, a node does nothing about its sensed data, i.e., node does not send data to the BS periodically.
KEEP_MOVING: A node does not maintain the pause time, instead, it walks continuously with random direction over the sensor field.
PAUSE_TIME_DURATION: The pause time T P is predefined. A node is out of the time and is labeled as 'Yes'.
WALK_TIME_DURATION: The walk time is predefined and interval of T W [min, max] sec. A node is out of the interval and is labeled as 'Yes'.
SPEED_INTERVAL: The speed of walk of a node is predefined and interval of V [min, max] m/sec. A node is out of the interval and is labeled as 'Yes'.
The pseudo-code of an unauthorized and malicious node detection of PdRWP model is given in Algorithm 2.
V. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
The simulations were conducted in MATLAB R2017a to investigate the performance of our proposed model. For a primary observation, the parameters used in the simulation are defined in Table 2 . The parameter of speed interval is defined as suggested in [11] .
Unlike the original RWP model, we used the fixed times for the parameters T P and T W in the simulations of the models. Moreover, our assumption was that a node can sense and communicate with other nodes during its pause time in PdRWP model. Fig. 4 . Although the models used the same parameters, the destination selections were independent because of their algorithmic differences. The simulation time (T ) was divided into 1000/4 = 250 rounds. The snap shots of the network conditions of the PdRWP and RWP models at a randomly selected round are shown in Figs. 7(a) and 7(b) , respectively.
In each round, an average of P×N = 0.3×30 = 9 member nodes were elected in PdRWP model and each of member nodes broadcasted a control message (Alert_Msg). The number of member nodes elected and the numbers of control messages sent during the rounds are shown in Figs. 8 and 9 , respectively. The number of control messages received by the neighborhood normal nodes during the rounds is shown in Fig. 10 .
Considering the control message broadcasted in the network, the RWP model differs from PdRWP model. As the RWP model does not use any control message, thus it does not dissipate any additional energy for broadcasting and receiving any message in the network. In contrast with the RWP, PdRWP model has an additional low overhead of control messages in the network that is defined as follows: Proof: At the pause time in each round, each of the member nodes broadcasts an Alert_Msg. Thus, there is an average of P × N Alert_Msgs in every round. Therefore, the overhead of control messages in the network is an average of O(P × N ). The factor TV O of a node has a significant impact on the V ESC of that node in the network. The V ESC of a node decreases with increases the TV O of the node and as a result, the V NESC could be decreased. However, the V NESC of PdRWP and RWP models are estimated as an average of 1.2340e +05 m 3 and 1.2184e +05 m 3 in each round, respectively as shown in Fig. 12 . The figure shows the V NESC of PdRWP model is higher than that of the RWP model and that is an average of 1560 m 3 per round. To measure the ESCR, we have utilized the V NESC of acting nodes on sensing during each pause time at each round. Besides, to reveal some other factors, we simulated the models 3 times for each of the results in the same network field considering different values of the parameters that are defined in Table 3 . The rest parameters used are described in Table 2 . The averages of the consequence results have been given along with Table 3 . From the results, it is revealed that when a sensing range r is constant, the V ESC and V NESC depend on the number of deployed nodes N in the network. The probability an increase in OSC exists with the increase of nodes and the consequence is that the total TV O of the nodes gets higher. Meanwhile, the factors nESCR and NESCR have a tradeoff between them. More clearly, the nESCR is a reciprocal function of N whereas the NESCR is proportional to αN,where α is a factor that can be determined by the ESCR of the constituted nodes. Thus, NESCR increases with increases the N but the individual node's ESCR could be decreased because of the higher probability of the factor TV O of a node in the network.
To observe the nESCR and NESCR at various speed intervals with different numbers of nodes, we simulated the models 3 times for each of the results. The various speed intervals and the number of nodes used are defined in Table 4 . The rest parameters used are shown in Table 2 . The averages of the outcome results are shown in Table 4 . The results show that if the network field, N , r, T W , and T P are fixed, the nESCR and NESCR decrease with increasing the higher value of the speed interval. Clearly, a defined higher speed interval increases the nodal average speed, then the number of constituted nodes' generates opposite directional angles at the moments of the touching boundary ages of the network field increases. Therefore, the probability of nodes' heading towards the middle region of the network field is higher and results in a higher probability of occurring OSC of the nodes in the network.
In addition, to observe the significance of the parameters P and R of PdRWP model, we simulated the model several times in the same network field considering different values of the parameters are defined in Table 5 . The consequence results of the simulations have been given along with the table. The results show that if the r is constant, nESCR and NESCR vary on the P and R. The nESCR and NESCR increase with increasing the value of the parameters.
Security Analysis: The mobility model is random-based, i.e., nodes can move randomly in any direction towards a random destination, with the restriction of the maximal distance between the current position and the destination. Fig. 15 shows the variation of detection time with the increase in node velocity. It is seen that there is a linear decrease in the detection time with increasing in velocity. When higher detection rates are expected, higher node velocities improve system performance.
In the experiment, we increased the number of compromised nodes gradually. Fig. 16 presents the dependency of the average detection rate to the percentage of malicious nodes. As we can observe, with the proposed approach, the attack can be detected based on the different survival strategies as discussed in Table 1 . Fig. 17 shows the receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curve which proves that our model ensures the security and privacy of sensors nodes in the IoT-WSN efficiently. Table 6 shows a qualitative comparison between PdRWP with RWP models. Based on the earlier analysis, PdRWP model outperforms RWP model in various scenarios. Nodes using PdRWP model is energy efficient in essence that the destinations selections of some nodes are partially determined and reduces the OSC. Hence, the data redundancy is reduced and nodes can save energy regarding the issue. Along with this, PdRWP model includes the nodes' authentication and privacy, unlike the RWP model that makes a robust and secure node mobility model for 3D WSNs in IoT applications.
VI. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, a secure and privacy preserving partial deterministic based random waypoint node mobility model is proposed. The model aims to reduce the overlapping sensing coverage in order to increase an effective sensing coverage in a 3D WSN and protects the network from unauthorized sensor node joining the network. It also detects the malicious node inside the network through survival strategies and broadcast the alert message in the network as well as excluded it from the network operation. The proposed model permits a percentage of nodes to determine their next destinations and speeds to walking, based on the moving information decided in random from the other given set of nodes. Besides, we have unfolded some vital factors to design a node mobility model, such as a heuristic to reduce the sensing region overlapping and a partially synchronized round. The extensive simulations show that our proposed model outperforms RWP model in terms of effective sensing coverage rate of both nodes' and network's perspective.
Likewise, the RWP model, if the network field is fixed, the nodes' effective sensing coverage rate is decreased with the increasing in the number of nodes in the network. In a densely deployed network, the performance of our proposed model tends to be random because of a node liable to reactive the number of neighbor nodes' information which is conflicted each other. This limitation is pivotal for future research in this area, and testing of the proposed model with various IoT-WSN data routing protocols in a secure way need to be discussed.
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